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measure, and thus an internality and gladness of the soul, self-moved within itself, which, through the serenity of the form, raises the soul high above all painful entanglement in the limitation of actuality.

With this we may close the consideration of the *special* forms into which the Ideal of art, in its development, comes to be divided. I have made these forms the object of an extended research in order to present the content of the same, and from which also the modes of representation are derived; for it is the content which, in art, as in all human work, is of chief moment. Art, in accordance with its idea, has no other vocation than to develop that which is essentially rich in content, to an adequate sensuous reality; and the philosophy of art must therefore undertake, as its chief business, to thoroughly comprehend what this wealth of content and its modes of manifestation are.

THE MATTER AND THE METHOD OF THOUGHT.

BY MEEDS TUTHILL.

"What is Mind? No matter.
What is Matter? Never mind.
What is Spirit? It is immaterial."

— *Punch*.

I. *The Matter.*

It may not be easy to say how many methods there are of thinking, especially if we count the ways that are not methods. But we may affirm that there are but two methods of getting knowledge—and indeed only one, since each of these two is partial, and needs the other for its own completion, and for the attainment of complete knowledge. For "knowledge" now seems to be divided into "facts" and "ideas," neither of which is willing to admit the existence of the other "as such," although they bear a family resemblance. This feud arises because one of these methods founds itself upon "external perception"—a contradiction in terms; the other, upon

“internal perception,” or, as it prefers to call it, “innate ideas” — which is begging the question, because it assumes the “knowledge” to be “innate” to begin with. These two methods, therefore, seem to be correlative extremes, neither of which can really do without the other, and which **must** in fact, consciously or unconsciously, find and use a **common** basis. For, indeed, when severed, and each pursued **abstractly**, they lead to the same substantial result, though the former only points to it — since it refuses all basis, it **can have** no capstone ; while the latter, we may say, begins with its result, and from that seeks to deduce all the particulars of the other method, and naturally finds no end in that process ; or if, as it usually does, it refuses all reality to the material basis of the other, it ends, of course, in — nothing. Idealism is too fond of abolishing facts, especially *hard* facts, just because they are hard and gross. Materialism, on the other hand, would fain return the compliment by showing thought to be “a mere secretion of the brain ;” but, in its zealous pursuit of the “positive,” it finds the “solid” attenuating itself and escaping from scientific grasp like a very “spirit.”

Shall we contemplate this deadly quarrel with *Punch's* philosophy of indifferentism, or can we find a common ground in which the “differences” disappear?

Each of these methods takes a double direction — one of analysis, to find the infinitesimal element ; the other, of synthesis, to find the Infinite All.

Thus, by the first method we have, on the one hand, an analysis of Matter into simpler components, — into infinite divisibility, and, therefore, into a single element, for no other would be indivisible ; on the other hand, it proceeds by a classification of classes to mount to an unattainable first class, or Universal ; and, by inference, merely, as in the other case, concludes a unity in that direction. The results of this method are well known ; there is no real demonstration, but only an inference, that, since there is a gradual elimination of life in a corresponding progression from “homogeneity to heterogeneity” of organization, therefore what we call “life” is only organic action, that, by reason of a growing complexity

which gives infinite relation, and consequent harmonization within and independence without, may develop into automatic freedom of action, and even into consciousness of self.

It is obvious that the logic of this method must be, like its own processes and results, merely formal and inferential. Its syllogisms are no proof, for want of a recognized basis, but are, as Mill admits, mere repetitive declarations of the same general fact, which finds its demonstration elsewhere, viz., in a conviction, "derived from experience," that Nature is uniform in its course of action; but, this "elsewhere" being thus found within us, there is really no conviction, only an inference, and hence no demonstration, after all. The difficulty in the logic is, that the *genus* is not found, or not admitted as such, and hence can receive no true definition. Hence, a *species* "connotes" more — *i.e.*, means more than its *genus*; and the individual "includes" most of all, and therefore, as mere matter of form, can, least of all, be included in the *genus*. All this difficulty would disappear if the *genus* were really genetic — *i.e.*, if, by its definition, it were that primary element from which all else is necessarily formed by mere composition. Hence Herbert Spencer's confusion of language in speaking of the "homogeneous" as being transformed into the "heterogeneous." It is only in this method of External classification that one *genus* could be conceived of as changing into other *genera*; for here there is no Universal, which is alone capable of developing itself into *genera*, and so on to individuals, and yet being itself in all, and most of all itself in the individual.

The other method — that of introspection — naturally begins by detecting this illogicality of its adversary's logic, and seeks to rectify that by also taking its first direction in analysis to determine the real genetic element of our ideal combinations; for the results of External Science exist only in these ideal combinations, and are to be tested therein, and their essence thus found. In the depths of Consciousness, therefore, we seek and find, upon analysis, that the first definition of a thing is found only in that which it is *not*. The *It* is fully defined or bounded by the *not-It*. But if the *It* be finite, the *not-It* must be infinite; and the *It* is null in comparison — essentially

nothing — existent only *in* and *by* the Infinite. We must begin, therefore, with the Universal. But, on the same principle of definition, every Infinite or Universal involves its own utter contradiction ; for we can think such conceptions only in cor-relatives of the Such and the not-Such. This method of absolutely clashing and self-resolving antithesis is, therefore, as necessary, the true and really logical method of thinking, if we are to begin with Universals. We can know the Universal only by reaction of the thought into it from the Particular ; and, conversely, the Universal is fully characterized — fully reveals itself to itself — only by development into the Particular ; otherwise, it is only elemental, simple, identical, indefinite, indeterminate, indefinable.

This method, therefore, finds its synthesis in its analysis ; for its element is its Universal, and both are single, and hence capable, the former, of all varieties of composition, the other, of all conceivable determinations or forms. The logical process of thought proceeds, like evolution in material Nature, from the simple to the complex ; and this is seen to be from the Universal to the Particular, not from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, in the sense of from one nature to another nature, but it is the fuller and fuller development of the same nature in the Particular, for the sake of particularization, or self-inclusion. Classification, therefore, proceeds downwards, instead of upwards, according to particular and specific forms, and not according to different natures. For the One exists in all as a potentiality ; the differences *in esse* are only different developments. We must begin, then, with this element — this potentiality — in which are involved all possibilities, and whose development necessarily proceeds by antithesis, or self-contradiction.

Let us carry out this method fully in its results. This Universal, this elemental, absolute Infinite, contains all possible contradictions (or it would not be such) ; but it contains them in solution ; the moment you release the one, the other starts up in antithesis as its definition — *i.e.*, as its own true nature. Extremes meet, and resolution is possible only by recognition of both in some common medium. This reduces every such

manifestation to mere particularity or special *form* of the Universal (and if, as is assumed by Idealism, "Thought" is the only universal *element*, its initial form is "The IDEA," and all subsequent *manifested* forms will be "Begriffs," or particular forms of developed Idea). But it is just as possible for this "element" to exist in one form as in another; nay, it *must* exist in all forms, and it only. The most abstract allegation we can make of any thing is, that it *is*; but this, to be defined, involves the contradiction, that it is *not*, and thus makes of the particular being only an appearance, or "becoming" of the Universal being. The universal being itself involves "nothingness" as its only complete definition—*i.e.*, it can really exist only as continual, active Change. In this result alone we see that its nature is necessarily Variety as well as Unity, and that this universe is not a crystallization, not a frame-work finished and hung up, nor a Voltaire's "clock," which kindly "presumes a clock-maker;" for the spirit that pervades it may be essentially defined as ceaseless "activity."

Now, among the infinite possibilities, Chance also exists—infinite chance; and that, too, not as a mere technicality, but as springing up with its counterpart, Necessity, as its inevitable mate; only so can the two nullify each other, co-terminate each other, and so form the round of change. The casual may be said to exist infinitely in respect to time and space; *all* might have been thus a moment sooner, or a hair-breadth elsewhere. And so, also, in the infinite interrelations of this congeries of particulars—of each to all the others, an infinity of infinities—there is the merest chance of any one particular being just so related as it actually is to every other. The relation of cause as consistency of the whole is found only by direct reference to the original One—to the centre; and other relations must be traced, like those of a genealogy, by ascent to the ancestor, and then by descent to the individuals. Hence any particular thing is a mere chance, except in regard to that with which it stands in immediate relation; only through the *next* has it any causal or consequential relation to other things, for the possible divergencies, at any point whatever, are infinite in number. This is illustrated in our inner

world. Every train of thought swarms with collateral invitations ; to diverge is easier than to go on ; choice must be positive, or chance will lead ; and even in choice, chance often decides. So, in the external world, there is “ infinite contingency,” varying, warping, deforming, and wasting far the most of even the persistent types of organic life. “ Mere Nature is too weak to keep its *genera* and species pure when conflicting with alien elementary influences.” Accidental variation is the rule in perpetual design.

But all this is mere superficial observation, and can tend only to melancholy reflection, as in the case of Mill, who gave up Cause, because he saw so much Chance. Let us go deeper, and see if there is not Design, even in Chance itself.

We have seen that only the immediate stands in causal relation ; all else is contingency—that is Mill’s doctrine, that Cause, to us, is only succession. But, were not this the case—were there an absolutely necessary and inflexible connection between things—Man could use neither Nature nor his own thoughts. As it is, he causes, creates even, by diverting the general flow of forces into particular channels of his own. It is this Chance which gives him Choice. On the other hand, this necessity of Nature, which binds immediates, is for him only a necessity for using means—for *imitating*. Once he finds these links, these laws, they become transformed by his use into his largest Freedom ; they constitute his creative power, and make him dominant over Nature through her own Absolutism. This looks as though the “ Absolute ” in the universe were seeking to realize its own meaning—to develop itself into action entirely free, self-moved.

Thus may all absolute contradictories, which seem to deny each other as absurdities—*i.e.*, irresolvable—resolve themselves into each other through the mediation of some thing in which they exist in common. Mere change may result from Chance or from Cause ; hence it may be relatively (for it is in its nature finite) either rational or irrational, good or bad, order or disorder, without departing from its strict, though devious derivation from the Absolute. For Chance also is Necessity, not merely in the Pagan sense of blind Fate, but because the

Absolute or unlimited involves all variety, and because Causality itself must reach its limit in Chance, in order that it may there be reflected back upon itself, and transformed into itself, as we see it is by Man. This elementary Caprice, in which absolute Volition loses itself, in order to find itself again, is the turning-point of its characterization, which gradually proceeds through Nature, till in Man volition is restored in its true character as rational.

Caprice is the most elementary form of Volition. The self may be said to be conscious of it rather as a being-acted-upon, than as an acting; for in it Act bears the simplest possible relation to self, its last and ultimate relation. In this respect the act of "creating" what we call Matter, merely, may be conceived as only the creator's most external caprice, of which he is conscious only in its reaction; that is, Matter is null until it passes into relations other than this simple one where it seems a non-self and this consciousness of self-in-it increases more and more as the relations of self-activity in it become more diversified and complex.

But, as the Finite cannot escape beyond the Infinite, so Matter is not, even in its simplest forms, unrelated to the Divine; the Divine activity is in it in *some* relating forming power. It may be the ultimate Divine differentiation; but, as we see it, it is proceeding to integrate itself in various relations. And just so fast and so far as Man can reproduce, in himself, these integrations, these relations of form, can he perceive and comprehend the Divine in Nature in the Universe.

For, let us observe that man begins with the simplest possible consciousness of sensation, which reacts into him as mere perception of a non-self; and his first act is one of the merest caprice, which can scarcely be called volition at all. He, as finite, *does* find some thing beyond him; and it is long, even after he deems his Will as his own, before it is truly such. Thus, he begins where the most external Divine activity ends; like meets like — activity meets activity, and comprehends it in a common element of relation. And this element is competent to integrate forms in Man as it does in Nature; only his inner universe must be of ideal forms, the creation of his own

activity. His thought exists, at first, only as perception, and that of the simplest sort ; yet that alone is a world-wide change in point of form, for it is the translation of Appearance into *Beholding* (*Begriff*) of the outer, static form into the inner, dynamic form ; and hence it is the beginning of a process of concretion in thought, which, like that in Nature, builds the complex upon the simple, and makes compounds the material for new and higher compounds ; yet all this world within is to be realized, integrated, from that single vanishing element of relation, in perception.

This primitive thought in Man is, therefore, a mere potentiality — an elementary capacity to be, do, and suffer. But in him this Divine element is seen, not merely as activity, but in its character as free activity. That introversion of the primitive, capricious, chaotic Nature upon itself has in him passed the limit of mere passivity — of merely being moved, and entered the sphere of freedom — of self-moving, and hence of consciousness. It is no longer mere reaction, but re-*Act* — that is, it is no longer merely felt, or suffered, or artficed in outer, passive forms, but is realized in its inner form as Being, Doing, Will. This is a capacity for attaining Divine *character*, and indicates an intent to represent the Divine *self* therein.

Here, then, is a liberation — a birth of Spirit from Matter, of Freedom from Caprice, of opposite from opposite. Where is its turning-point ? and how is the human Spirit — this interior image of the Divine — there related, in its origin, to the exterior activity of the Divine in Matter ?

That is the question of questions, upon which the materialist and the idealist meet in absolute contradiction, and yet in agreement ; for their difference is only about names — the one says all is matter ; the other, all is spirit. The one has begun with Matter, and traced its development into Spirit ; the other has begun with Spirit, and traced its development into Nature — into Matter. When extremes thus meet, their solution is unity. Neither party has really dealt, in its theories, with any thing but activity and relation. When it comes to the question of *Substance*, the one says the Substance is that in which the activity and relation are found ; the other says

the same, but insists that, on this very ground, Spirit is the substance, since that alone is conscious of possessing activity and power to relate — *i.e.*, to reason.

To be sure, the materialist poohs at this “ideal” substance, this matter of “thought,” as no Matter at all compared with the solid and appreciable Matter of the senses; it exists only in thought — it comes from nothing, and goes for nothing.

But the idealist retorts: And how, pray, do you assure yourself that any thing of your material universe exists, except by thought? You can doubt of every thing except this “nothing” of thought: You are sure of but one thing: that there is thought, and a thinker, if it be only yourself.

And this answer is very just, as bringing all our knowledge down to its elementary basis in self-consciousness; but does it justify the counter-assertion that “Thought” and its “Ideas” are the only real existence? “Thought,” to be sure, is precisely that “existence” which springs from Nothing, and disappears in Nothing, and so answers to the Hegelian definition of Being — it *is*, yet is *not*. But, logically, this permits “Thought” to exist in *any* form — in Matter as well as in Spirit. And so it does, in this same purely abstract sense — *i.e.*, it exists in both as the *form* of the activity. But this abstraction has dropped out the vital element of *relation*, which is essential to integration in *any* form, particular or universal, outer in Act, or inner in Thought. And if we seek, in self-consciousness, for “Thought” as a “universal element,” we must connect it by relation to a Thinker, and thus see that it is only Knowledge. But we have the same right, and duty, to find in self-consciousness the relation of “activity” and Actor. This complements things, and enables us to conceive that mere “Thought,” or Knowing, may have its inner forms, to which will correspond, as partial or complete, particular or universal, the outer forms of Activity. Thus, Matter may be outer forms of the same various activity which exists also in the inner forms of mere thinking, feeling, semi-passivity as knowing. This is very apparent in Man, who knows that he has a body as well as a thinking faculty; and that, though this body seems

“another self,” yet is it thought into form and preserved in its own activity by a “non-self.”

Here is a marked distinction between three things which are sometimes said to be identical, to wit, the relation between Spirit and Matter, Soul and Body, God and Creation.

The relation between Spirit and Matter is really treated as an abstract one — *i.e.*, the one side is set in utter opposition to the other; Spirit is regarded as mere activity, and Matter as that which is acted upon; and the question of Substance is not determined, or is left in the ambiguous position above indicated. The relation of God to Creation, if treated in the same abstract way, results in a similar mere abstract separation; only here, as the terms are taken in a concrete sense, there is a separation also of substances, but no determination of either. (And here “Substance” gets treated after the Chinese fashion of resting the Earth on an elephant, tortoise, etc.; the difficulty is removed by *only* removing it — out of sight. This building a series toward an Infinite is quite unnecessary; for the “self” is near at hand, and in that, itself an infinite wonder, must be found and solved the question of Substance). But the relation of Soul to Body presents the question in a double aspect, abstract and concrete, neither of which can be escaped. Its solution, therefore, calls for the union of the abstract and concrete methods of thought. For our minds do not wait for ideal abstraction before they conceive of God, although such idea of God as is formed undoubtedly depends for its details upon the progressive development of ideas. But conception passes at once from the concrete idea of self to that of the non-self without defining the “self” in either case — *i.e.*, without separating Substance from its activity.

The whole question and its solution, therefore, is in Man; and he is not allowed to delude himself with mere abstractions — a good reason, perhaps, for the junction of soul and body. We know very well that our thoughts do not constitute the Universe, nor our self, God. But we are equally certain that our thoughts are our means of knowledge and our means of creation — the link between ourselves and our acts; and hence they are the only analogies by which we can con-

ceive of the abstract relations between Spirit and Matter, as our "self" is the only analogue we have for concrete conception of God in relation to Creation.

Now, our thoughts, as such, are mere abstractions from *acts*; they are not concrete as acts, and yet they are products of the mind's activity. Hegel may tell us that, in this activity, the Spirit "uses its own material." But what material?

It is conceivable, to be sure, that, since Idea may take form in any material, so the mind may use a different material than that of the senses—a spiritual material, or plasticity. But this does not explain the *Beholding* of ideas, in its active sense, nor prove that these inner forms are not still "material" in the sense of ethereal; in fact, it only "removes" the difficulty, and leaves the Idea itself still only an abstraction relatively to the thinking act and the *Beholder*. Why seek, then, to remove the "material" at all? A thousand removes will not "change the matter," in this aspect of it.

Hegel, therefore, means nothing more, practically, than the use of simple conceptions to form the complex—the construction of thoughts from thoughts. But the mind uses quite another material, in addition to this, even in its most abstract activity; for it wastes and devours the bodily tissues in this process. Its reactionary effect, in this respect, is presumably the same as would be the direct effect upon the body from receiving the same thought, in the same form, through the sensations. In both cases, then, there is this unconscious interaction of soul and body, as a necessity of the *expression* of thought, whether it be by others to us, or by us to ourselves. We are in this intimate and direct contact with God's Matter. There is this union of His activity and ours, as method, means, and effect of thinking, in any of its forms; for thought resolves itself, in sense, as mere motion and relation of motions, in the form of nerve-vibrations, etc. Perception is what the Beholder first knows as Beheld, in sensation.

That thought exists only in Man, therefore, *especially in his utterance*, may well be dependent upon organization; since it requires a complexity of organization to develop a sufficient complexity of relation, in mere motion, to make it a carrier of

this sort. And we observe that experience and training are necessary to enable us to appreciate the more complex sensations of eye, ear, and taste ; childhood prefers the simpler combinations, the broader contrasts in color, music, flavor, etc.

Hence the absurdity of the contempt which "Idealism" affects for Matter, and especially of its *dictum* to avoid "the sensuous" in the expression of "pure thought" ; although it is obvious that "the sensuous" is an absolute necessity for expression of any thought. Such silly Pharasaism may be tolerated when "pure thought" has produced some thing purer than a lily, more beautiful than a rose, or more exquisitely spiritual than God's living poem in a love-lit eye. And as God does not find Matter beneath His use, so Man is never divinely creative, but his thought rushes to his senses and "wreaks itself upon expression," like Shakespeare's, in words and images concrete with an infinite meaning. Mr. Conway tells us that "many excellent people in London" confess that they have seen Madame Blavatsky "make lilies blossom from the end of the cigarettes of which she is fond," etc. Which shows, if nothing more, that the imagination can transport itself into the senses so powerfully that its vivid impression seems to us a reality ; a cause of credulity, but, nevertheless, a source of power both to receive and to express. It is a well-known fact that every human face "lightens" more or less with the inner thought and feeling, and especially takes on a permanent expression, in its "lines of thought," of the habitual, characteristic activity of the soul within, which thus draws its own portrait in Matter.

And when we consider this fashioning of the body itself by the mere reaction of the inner spirit, we see the error of that "pure Religion" which makes the same pretension as "pure thought" to *not* use, or even abuse, this body — to discard it as an implacable enemy, instead of recognizing it as an indispensable and Divinely-given means both for receiving and expressing spiritual activity. Is it not wiser to note that even in this "flesh" the spirit's habitual action imprints its own "lines of beauty" or of ugliness, and thus declares itself responsible for that which is permanent in this perpetual

change—this flow of Matter, which we call a body,—and whose motions are at once our source of knowledge and our means of action? The body is, indeed, practically nothing but this motion; it cannot exist organically except by this constant change; and this very fact is what subjects it to the spirit; for that may have permanency of purpose by which to give form and character to this change.

And as for that “pure philosophy” which takes a similar opposition to “the sensuous,” it equally “negates,” or else stultifies itself; for, even if it did not have its own birthplace in “the sensuous,” and therefore have no right to disown its own mother, yet must it go there for a second and real birth in expression, or else confess itself an impracticable philosophy—a religion that no one can either preach or practice.

While our thoughts, therefore, are mere abstractions when unrelated to acts, our *thinking* is an activity which has a *real* as well as an ideal effect; it produces a change in the relations of matter, by motion. But if this is so in our case, why not also in the case of the Universal Thinker? How is Matter to exist at all except as the minimum form of that Universal Activity in its *quasi*-passivity—in its infinitesimal element of relation—just capable of being taken up and integrated in the conceptions of our thought, first as simple perception of Being as change, then as perception of other relations, and so on in various rational completeness as concrete idea?

In other words, the activity of The One may be susceptible of such distinctions as we make, in our own, between act and thought, thought and feeling, and so on, down to the mere existence of our activity, dying away into its passive relation to sense. In this view, Matter would not exist as a “creation,” but rather by passive permission of God, as only one condition or state of His activities; and His act in it, instead of being an absolute one, as we are taught to consider it, would be the least absolute of all, except in the sense of absolute simplicity—a letting-be. Thus, Matter would exist for spirit only as this “let-be,” this external cessation of its own activity; and creation would really begin with that activity which is formative, relational, and proceed to that which is

positive and willed, gradually bringing this mere elemental activity of universal being out of its mere "let-be," and through the chaotic state of feeling into the definite forms of thought. Creation, in this sense, is *conception*—definite selection, adaptation, and formation of activity; and thus it is a bringing into birth of the inner self as an object of contemplation.

This is the genesis of thought and act in us. Is not such, also, the genesis of Spirit from Matter? Spirit is the "Be;" Matter, the "Let-be." One is the *Act* of the Will, and the production of *Self*; the other, mere act and progressive product of various *thinking*.

Says Hegel, in one of those side-remarks which, like side-glances, are most penetrating: "Perception is the *birthplace* of a new and higher principle," *i.e.*, of a new and higher form of activity—free, rational activity—will. Hence, Matter is not a nonentity, but only the outermost form of activity—a mere striving-to-be—the last pulsation of the Infinite activity in its remotest capillaries before the inevitable return towards the Heart Divine. And in that glad return it takes on all those forms of blushing flower and song of bird which can express or voice what is beautiful, in approaching the inmost of that Divine Activity.

"The Essence of Matter," says Hegel, "is gravity: It seeks for its being out of itself; and, could it find this unity it seeks, it would vanish, and be no longer matter." We know not, to be sure, what would happen if all matter could amass itself, by cataclysm or otherwise, in one world instead of so many; but we may suspect, from present appearances, that "transformation," not "annihilation," would be the proper word. Matter "vanishes" now in quite the opposite direction to that of gravity, and takes the earliest occasion to do so; for there is no affinity which it does not prefer to that of gravity. Could it move the other way, and get outside the Infinite, it must cease to be; but, as it is, gravity is only its first, and not its only characteristic. Gravity is only its means of entering into more complex relations; that seems to be its only thought. Looking at its movements on

the largest scale, we see that gravity combines at once with another force, and these two alone form the grand harmony of unnumbered spheres — the first pæan of Matter over its return to that Order which is “Heaven’s first law” — the first step back to spirituality.

And what before that first organization? Chaos! Matter only in relation of that blind and furious activity of Caprice, a condition which might well give rise to the myth of “fallen angels.” Elemental Spirit-forces, banished into the uttermost of outer darkness, and rushing back, like an army with banners, to rescale the lost Heaven by sheer violence — a violence which defeats itself.

Poor Slave, Matter! We pity you! But take courage! Even in your blind fury you did not take the road to annihilation, but that to freedom. Yours is that pathetic myth — the perpetual PASSION of the Universe — God made manifest by *self-denial* therein, that he may reclaim and reconquer this Material World to Himself, by transforming it, “bringing its immortality to light,” making of it a new and Spiritual World.

Accordingly, we find that, though by gravity matter tends to unity, as if to signify that in its element it is single, and represents divine activity in its utmost simplicity, yet does it seek complexity rather than singleness, so much so that we have not yet been able to find the latter (we can no more find the infinitesimal than the Infinite of Divine action). It shuns death, and seeks living forms; but, to attain these, must previously build itself up into food for them — as, *e.g.*, the mineral for the vegetable, the vegetable for the animal. It “uses its own material,” and yet, through all this toilsome process, is indestructible, for it reproduces *itself*, in all its forms, from that of the simplest carrier of force, up to that of living germs. Truly, there is nothing worthy of contempt here, if we are to regard Matter, as we do spirit, abstractly, as a “self,” or a “substance.”

And what is this question of “substance,” which figures so largely in metaphysics? We may be told to spare our sympathy for “dead matter;” that it has no “substantial being,”

if there really be life in it, yet is it blessed with unconsciousness of that fact, etc. And truly, in the vegetable we detect no consciousness, even of its own existence. To the animal we conceded only a consciousness of being; and to man himself, in fact, self-consciousness is a thing of growth, and rarely is it developed to that degree in which one is conscious of the subtlest movements and relations of his thoughts. But we may say that even the mineral has a "natural selection;" the vegetable, a chance choice; the animal, an unconscious choice; and man has all these, and all the way up to conscious choice, and thereby morality, self-regulation, and responsibility.

And, unfortunately, he has also the capacity to ask, What is Substance? but not the capacity to answer that query. The word itself is a misnomer, as it is used, and betrays its origin in the mere habit of a being dependent upon something external. When it is sought to apply it, therefore, to an independent being, it is no wonder the attempt is a profound failure. Such a being could never ask himself, What is my substance? What stands under me to support me, or enables me to act? So the power of metaphysics has shown itself in the fact that, by long, though useless, repetition of the question, the word has gained in general use a quite different meaning, though, naturally, a very vague one — *e.g.*, the query commonly means, What is the gist, the amount, the *sumstance* of it all? And in metaphysics it asks, really, What is the nature — the whole nature of the thing? — or it asks for nothing. For, to make it inquire merely what is stable, permanent, static, in contradistinction to dynamic, is only to ask for a condition, a state of things, — the passive or, at least, quiescent state, in contrast with the active state. Thus, we conceive of Matter as in its "natural," and only stable condition, when *at rest*, and we have just the opposite conception of spirit, as purely dynamic; and hence it puzzles us to conceive of any thing static, or substantial in spirit, because we abstract it from everything static by making that only its object — the passive receiver of its action. And so, carrying out these abstract notions to the universal scale, Philosophy separates God

from the material universe — the one as creative action, the other as passive creation ; and when, after such a separation, it seeks to find the substantial again in God, it finds that it has made of Him only a Power, and put all His “ substance ” in the Universe itself. Refusing to join these two, from horror of Pantheism, it makes both God and Creation “ incomprehensible,” to mend the matter. Matter is “ made out of nothing,” yet is left to take care of itself. And God, even as a Power, is powerless, for He is “ unchangeable,” and hence must be inactive, since change itself must be the only permanent “ state ” of an active being. Thus, the notion of substance as *object* sets God, as *unsubstantial*, outside the “ material universe.”

And so, the other abstract notion of substance as *subject* — as Actor — has a similar result of setting God, as “ Perfection,” in opposition, and even enmity to Man, as Imperfection, in what is called “ the Spiritual Universe,” — another “ incomprehensible ” creation. For Spirit, being associated with mere ideas, is, in man, reduced to a mere nullity. In *this* creation all the “ Substance ” remains in God, but remains there, in accordance with its conception, as an abstraction. To render Him completely “ Perfect,” this substance is “ indefectible ” and “ immutable,” so that He ceases to be an actor ; He “ cannot act but once.” “ He is an Eternal Act.” Such is the effect of being Perfect. So that God, as Spirit, even ceases to be dynamic. He has no occasion to think any more ; and in this eminently and only static condition He must be regarded as merely “ a Fixed Idea.” But Man’s spirit, being only Imperfection, is, of course, of a contrary type ; and he, too, must become “ a fixed idea,” if possible, for “ thinking ” is one of his most diabolical characteristics. In this worse than nonentity of all his spiritual activity, Man has only the consolation of lashing his body as even more Satanic than himself ; though it has the advantage of being of a perishable substance, and so can see an end to its misery, which the soul cannot.

And Idealism comes in to cap the climax of abstraction, by declaring that what is ideal is real, and what is real is ideal, or

nothing; that Thought is the only substance, and Ideas the only entities. As for the THINKER, it leaves us in doubt whether He might not have been a mere development from this all-powerful substance, and whether we other Thinkers have not the right to claim an equal independence in the same origin. For here the only "substance" is Activity.

Is it not obvious that the concrete method is necessary to offset and rationalize these vagaries of abstraction; to bring God into the world as a fact—as a Self; to give him fellowship with Man; to restore to Him that compassion which makes Him even a fellow-sufferer with His children; and, in fine, to make of this Universe a living thing, and such a reality of good and evil, perfection and imperfection, as we know it to be?

Each of these notions of Substance, we see, is an attempt at abstraction; for it seeks to sever the Actor, the Activity, and the Object—or, in other words, the Self and the non-Self. But in an Infinite One there must be "substantially" the same—*i.e.*, the Self is only a consciousness of the All in its one source of activity; and the non-Self, or Object, is only a form of this activity, shaped in the one substance, whether this activity be what we call "ideal" or what we call "material." This, in fact, may be called Hegelian doctrine, except that it claims translation of Matter into the ideal form, as well as the reverse. And how escape this double result? If ideal substance is capable of getting into material form, does it thereby render itself incapable of getting out of it, or else destine itself thus to perish? In short, does not the All-substance necessarily imply all-capability both to take and to change form, through infinite gradation of appearance? And this, too, whether such appearance be of the Self, or the non-Self. The main point here is to distinguish between consciousness of self, as self, and consciousness of object of activity as a non-self, *e. g.*, of ideas or other forms of partial activity. In *The Self*, this substance may have special spiritual or celestial form, in which is displayed, at least, the whole character of the Self; or the latter may thus retreat, for full self-consciousness, into a thousand removes of unutterable

forms of Divine Thought in this same substance. On the other hand, this Divine self, for aught we know, may, at any time or place in the Universe, take any special form or manifestation, according to the capacities of the Beholders thereof; but such form must, at least, fully characterize that Self. Hence Hegel, regarding Man's "Thought" as wholly contingent of the Divine Self, was logically obliged to recognize the possibility, and, indeed, the fact of Divine Incarnation in Man; though he has done so in a somewhat ambiguous way, which leaves some of his disciples free to regard it as of merely "ideal" significance—*i.e.*, merely as a recognition of the "unity" of man with God—and thus a species of spiritual Pantheism; while others see in it, not a special, but a general fact—a proof of Divine Nature even in the brutal savage—and thus a no-God, but a sort of Pantheon, in which all are gods, by reason of possessing the elementary "Idea."

But this ambiguity disappears when we dismiss this "Thought" as a mere abstraction, and consider it only as it is—an object which takes form from active substance as a non-Self, whether as Idea or as external "thing." Let us consider this more in detail. And let us remember that *the* Self is known, and is knowable, only as *consciousness* of one's own activity, which is susceptible of all shades and degrees, from unconsciousness of this Self in an Object up to that Infinite consciousness of all in the God-Self. Hence, this self retreats infinitely before us, whether we regard it within as Actor, or without as Object; and, in both directions, our knowledge vanishes as infinitesimal. On the one hand, Self is a deep within deep of hidden power, that can show itself only as Activity; on the other hand, it unites this power with its object, even in the ideal element of mere contemplation, in the last shred of its substance as Self—*i.e.*, when that object exists for it only as relative, either real or imagined. Thus, we have the Actor, the Activity, and the Object all in the Self; so that, when differentiated down to an abstraction, Self is nothing more nor less than that infinitesimal element of relation which is null in itself, but not so when reconnected with our own or another's thinking, for then it is what con-

stitutes thought and ideas in every form. Hegel's immense power consists wholly in this: that he has fully realized this method of thinking by self-relation.

Let us note, then, that the conception or the consciousness of Self, as such, escapes wholly, and in both directions, from the idea of substance. On the one hand, it seeks in vain, with the varying form of substance, to reach its inmost; on the other, it loses the notion of substance, exteriorly, in the conception of mere relation. Thus, self-consciousness is wholly independent of substance, and dependent only on activity. To constitute a *self*, therefore, it is necessary only that an activity should be consciously free, whether in substance of its own or in that of another. The distinction between Selves—between the Man-self and the God-self—is not in the consciousness of activity, not in the reality of the self, but in the additional consciousness in the one that this activity is dependent upon another for its substance; and in the other, that he is not so dependent.

Thus, self resolves formally—*i.e.*, really—into selves within self, as does substance into substance within substance, no one can say to what remove. And this we find, in fact, to be the Reality, both in nature and in thought: there is but a successive transformation of substance into an inner substance, and of self into an inner self.

Of Substance, then, we can know nothing, except in the various forms which are given it by the Divine activity and our own; and this will test the “substantiality” of our products and the “Reality” of God's, for it shows us wholly dependent upon His substance for our means of activity.

Thus, the Divine substance cannot be known apart from the Divine activity—separate, static, “by itself,” and thus at rest. Such a substance would be a mere Brahm, such as the foregoing static theory of “Perfection” makes it; for it could have no consciousness of itself, since even that would be an act of contemplation. We know neither our own nor God's real nature apart from activity, for there is no such nature; it is “incomprehensible,” because it does not exist. Nature is not an abstract, but a concrete; God there puts His activity

into form, and thus partially displays His thought, His character, but not His *self*. Man, also, can recognize his own character in his acts; his ideas, in the forms he gives them. "That is substantially my idea," says an artist, meaning his composition of form, *e. g.*, in a statue. He does not say it is himself, nor his own form, but only that it expresses the substance of his idea; and so it does, for that idea has no substance except form, and hence is equally presented by any suitable form. In *any* form, an idea is a self only in the abstract sense of relation of parts constituting a *whole*.

And so, we may conceive that God also has ideas apart from substantial form, or inexpressible save to Himself, in His inmost forms of substance; or ideas expressed elsewhere in the Universe, and not here, too complex, or otherwise inapt for expression by such forms as we can either contemplate exteriorly, or comprehend with our undeveloped interior forms of idea. But, if there is that in Divine ideas thus beyond expression to us (even in a Divine man), so, on the other hand, must the Divine activity combine with substance, in forms of the utmost simplicity of relation, and of the merest transiency of static condition; the one extreme is as necessary as the other to Divine perfection. Everywhere this elementary activity is only a potentiality, but one which asks only for relation to constitute it a higher and higher form or expression of Divine thought in the Divine substance. Thus, God says to us, *e. g.*, in the flower: "That is My idea; repeat it, and comprehend it in the ideal form of your activity." The flower is a reality, therefore; not a mere idea, but an idea expressed in the Divine, substantial form, and hence with a being of its own, a life and an identity of its own; it is not absorbed in abstract Reason, and thus annihilated, but it remains concrete, as it is, and lovable for its own sake — "a thing of beauty and a joy forever."

Thus, Divine ideas, when realized in any form, remain "immanent" in the Divine substance as long as the form itself subsists; and this without at all destroying the Divine inner-self, but, on the contrary, as the only means of distinction of the Divine activity from the Divine self by the reac-

tive effect of an object of contemplation which is not self. This is not "a lonely God," who thus lives in a self-consciousness which depends upon creative, formative activity; any more than a fruitful mind is lonely, when expanding itself in multiform creation of ideas which seem to it like the unconscious blossoming of a Divine life in it.

But this makes of Reason only a free activity of spirit, and of spirit only a form of the Divine substance? Even so; for every real form must inhere in the Divine substance, and be in itself, only a secondary whole, or self. To render this statement more explicit, and possibly more clear, let us bear in mind that we are only *to be* free—that we must "be born into the spirit," which is the only form of our freedom; and then let us first conceive of this "spirit" as an interior elimination of another from this bodily, *slave-form* of substance—a transformation of the *same* substance into the *free* form of spirit. Have we, in fact, any warrant to believe that this spiritual form is any more our own than this bodily form? Can Spirit, any more than Matter, wrench itself from the Divine whole, and be independent thereof? In fact, they are brought, in Man, into actual contact and intimate interrelation, as if to intimate that this Divine substance is every where identical, and capable of all forms of activity. Shall it be susceptible of the slave-form, and not also of the free? Of the non-self, and not of the self? And here we see, again, that the self escapes substance—*i.e.*, resolves it into an infinite series of transformations of the same thing. And in the larger, Divine aspect of this transformation, a self—a free-born potentiality—completes the round of the Divine activity in or upon its substance, and returns it from that objective, or out-looking phase—changes it into this form of in-looking—this consciousness of self. Both these aspects are contained in Man; his body also is a "Begriff," a be-grasp, or *beholding* of the Divine thought, expressed in substantial, but passive form; and his "spirit" is, or becomes, a beholder, in the freely-active sense, and finds God in His whole character, not by looking outward (for there He is seen only objectively and partially), but only by looking inward into this infinite mystery of self.

But yet this does not explain the Ego — the reality of self-being? it reduces it, in fact, to a mere nullity? For, if we have no substance of our own, even in the Spirit, how can we have any real activity of our own? Is not that thus made a mere return of God's activity into his own self-consciousness?

That, truly, is a vital question, and it calls to mind Descartes' intense efforts at introspection, and the characteristic French precision with which he expresses its results. His first conclusion is this: —

"I am a substance of which the whole essence, or nature, is merely to think." Thus disconnecting himself from his body, as not being a "thinker," and therefore not his real self, nor any thing he knows "certainly," he proceeds to reflect whether there be any other "certain" knowledge than this self-knowledge; and, from the presence in himself of imperfection of nature, in conjunction with his idea or conception of "perfection," he concludes that there is another self — another thinker, God — from whom alone he could have derived this idea of perfection; and he "judges that if there be any bodies in the world, or indeed any *intelligences*, which are not wholly perfect, their being must depend upon His power, in such sort that they could not subsist without Him a single moment."

Thus, he really vacates Man of all "substantial" being, even in his "intelligence," and finds, like us, that he is only "a thinker" in another's substance. And, indeed, what is the difference between a "body" and a "soul"? They both "hold" God's Thought; the only difference is that one holds it statically, the other dynamically — the one holds it passively, the other echoes and repeats it. Is this mere repetition, imitation, of God's Thought in us really our own?

We find here, first, a question of fact, which is fundamental to all knowledge. However mysterious it be that this free activity is linked to substantial dependence, the fact, itself, of our free action in Thought cannot be even denied without affirming it; for, to deny it is to do an act which is claimed to be free. There is in us, beyond dispute, this translation of the involuntary activity of the body into the voluntary action of

the soul, though it be gradual, infinitesimal in its beginning, and all along rather "I wish" than "I will." And thus, on further reflection, we see that this very freedom is only in that same imperfect form from which we inevitably derive, as from all other imperfections in us, the idea of the "Perfect" by mere antithetic and necessary correlation. The mere *idea* of God is, therefore, necessarily associated with this fundamental and only "certain" knowledge of our selves, though it be only that we "think."

But, as *fact*, God must be Infinite Freedom to correlate this finite freedom and make *it* a reality. Only in such a *relation* to an Infinite Other can this infinitesimal self have any assured being as activity; but *in* such relation it is not only conceivable, but necessary. It is necessary that this subordinate self should exist, not as substance, but only as free activity — not as Quantity, but as Quality; for, as we have seen, Substance is only the means, the form of the self, and not the Self itself, which escapes all form. Man's dependence upon Substance is, therefore a proof, and not a contradiction, of *his* finite freedom; for it is also his formal *independence* of Substance — *i.e.*, he is not dependent upon this body, or this Spirit, or other particular form of that Substance, but has a capacity for free activity in any form thereof, if so be he develop that capacity to repeat God's forms of activity therein.

On the other hand, for Man to exist as "substance" would be to have a *fixed* and limited independence, instead of an independent freedom of development; the former places him outside the Infinite — *i.e.*, he ceases to exist, even as Quantity, for he is deprived of all *relation*. It is only as free activity that he can either be a Self, himself, or represent the inmost Self of the Divine nature. So, also, Man, as this image of God, must be finite, because it is not the ALL of the Universe that can show the inmost of the Divine, or reveal its highest capacity, or even represent its Self; but the highest glory and inmost power of the Divine is shown only in this: that it can repeat its whole Self in its least act — can be infinitesimal as well as Infinite. Hence, as we have seen, this uttermost of Self comes up only from an infinite depth in the Divine, and

so it returns to God objectively from a similar depth of apparent nothingness — of mere vanishing infinitesimal relation — which is yet the germ of the All.

Thus, we find that consciousness of self depends merely upon free activity, not on Substance ; that such a self in Man, because it is finite, depends upon the Divine Substance, and in that relation only could exist as such ; and that, in the Divine, or Infinite Being, such subordinate selves, or free activities, are necessary as a return toward Himself, or re-transformation of His own activity into His own consciousness in its free form — its in-look toward Self. Souls are the first forms of God's introspection.

Hence the whole nature of Man — of his free Self — is to imitate, to repeat God's activity, to translate it into higher forms of Substance, and thus to return it to Him as a recreation of His own inmost thought. Only in this sense can Creation become a complete or perfect work of God — one which is not merely objective and static, but dynamic and perpetual, like Himself, and existing in His consciousness of Self, as his own constant and whole activity therein. This work is progressive, after the production of "Spirit," as well as before ; all before that is only preparatory, partial activities, having their results in merely objective forms of the Divine thought, in its ever-changing idea, feeling, let-being. This only is the full act of Will that commands the *Self* to "Be !" If we may admit the common statement that God *lets* be what He does *not* "Will," as well as what He wills, we shall have, at least, a practical distinction between this passive, or partial, embodiment of the Divine thought in Nature, and its complete and vital characterization in Man's inmost being as a Self.

This self, as we have seen, can find its real being, not in any substance of its own, but only and simply in its free, but limited and finite activity. It is so related to substance, however, that it can translate even the relation of motion in matter into ideal form. And as thus it transforms Divine activity in Matter into its own in thought, so does it exchange activities with other selves. Conversely, every thought it builds up within is at the expense of this "natural" material, upon

which it reacts, as if to send its electric message through, or leave its impress on, this Divine substance, and thus make it reach the consciousness of that Infinite Self-of-All. And as for expression to others—in word, act, life—it is obviously wholly dependent upon a substance not its own. Thus utterly dependent for substance, it is only measurably and potentially free. It is free to develop, but not free in scope; it has, so to speak, the element of time at its command, but not that of space. It begins with Thought, not in its infinite quantity, but only in its infinitesimal element of relation, and is free to integrate it and test its results by comparison with God's thought in Nature. Thus, there is no "infinity" in its thought, any more than in itself. Most assuredly, *this* self is Man, and not God.

This discussion of "substance" may not be wholly fruitless, therefore, if it helps us to understand how there can be a God-self, and also other selves in the image of His own, and yet practically, "substantially" dependent, just because they are free. For the penalty of Freedom is to be free—to be necessitated to re-create Earth, Heaven, and God for one's self, and in order to be really a Self. This Freedom, as we have seen, has its only *real* character and design as an *imitation*,—a repetition and return of God's activity into His own consciousness, as truly *like* His own. In this, its only *real* aspect, Man's Freedom involves Necessity, both for him and for God. It is Necessity for God, because He cannot lay the hand of force upon it without destroying its moral character, and He must, therefore, freely offer to it of His substance as means of action—as He does, both in particular forms and in those general forms which we call "laws," in the use of which Man finds his largest material freedom, so to speak, in following the material Will of God. And this fact itself is a revelation to Man, and suggests to him, when he comes to be cognizant of "moral laws," that inasmuch as power almost infinite—power to "remove mountains"—accrues to him from identifying himself with "material laws," so these higher, spiritual laws, or Will of God, though he is free to dis-

obey them, and be a slave, are yet offered him as means of his largest Freedom. Thus his Freedom is Necessity for him, because he can reach it only through the Mediation of God as Substance, Law, Goodness — in short, by an activity which is *imitation* — thus showing him that if he would be truly Man, he must be, not God, but *like* God. For his freedom remains forever in the womb of Time; it must be “born again” before it can even become truly Freedom; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that its course will be through similar, successive palingeneses, which bring their higher forms suited to higher capacities, for even a pure “spiritual,” and still another “celestial” form of our poor “*Begriff*” may be inadequate to comprehend the whole of God’s “*IDEA*” in all the complexity of its Universality.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

DR. STIRLING AND PROF. CAIRD.

The length of Dr. Stirling’s discussion of “Kant’s Idea of Causality, in Relation to Prof. Caird’s Interpretation of Kant,” which we announced in our last number, compels us to defer its publication to the January number. Prof. Caird’s article on “Kant’s Deduction of the Categories, with special Relation to the views of Dr. Stirling,” is in hand, and will appear in the same number. — Ed.]

PHILOSOPHY AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

[We have received from Prof. George S. Morris (who has recently entered upon his duties in the chair of philosophy at the above-named institution — both professor and university are to be congratulated on this auspicious event for philosophy) a circular announcing his programme for 1879-80. The list of topics is inviting. — Ed.]

“History of Philosophy, and Ethics. Instruction in these subjects will be given during the last half of the academic year, and will include (a) a course of public lectures; (b) critical and expository